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Emergency management and contingency planning (EU20)

Incident and Crisis Management (ICM) within the Vattenfall Group is steered by Group instructions that are part of the Vattenfall Management System (VMS). The purpose of ICM is to ensure that all types of incidents and crises are managed in a professional, secure and responsible manner. The main objective is that the organisation shall always be prepared and equipped to perform effectively in an incident or crisis situation. Incident and crisis handling must be an integrated part of the daily business activities in order to be able to handle extraordinary situations that can occur.

The basic requirement is that all units within the Vattenfall Group whose operations involve risks that may lead to an incident or crisis must be able to manage any such incident or crisis. This implies that:

  • Analysis must be performed of all risks that may lead to a crisis.
  • Business continuity plans shall be in place if the risk is unacceptable.
  • An emergency management plan shall be in place.
  • An emergency management group shall be appointed, prepared and trained.
  • There must be capacity for taking care of personnel and family who are affected by a crisis.

Functional Group instructions are also in place, which contain more detailed requirements for business continuity planning. One example is the Group Instruction for Information Security, which lays out special requirements for business continuity management.

In 2007 and 2008 the Vattenfall Group developed a new Group-wide Incident and Crisis Management (ICM) concept that broadens the scope of crisis management. It includes a new Group-wide ICM organisation, which was operational by 1 July 2008. The ICM unit includes Duty Officers for Crisis Management and Crisis Communication with 24/7 responsibilities, at both the Group and Business Group levels. Vattenfall’s Executive Management Group also appoints Directors-on-Duty, who also have 24/7 responsibilities. The ICM organisation focuses on monitoring events, supporting the line organisation, and when needed (extraordinary circumstances) taking the lead in incidents and crisis situations.

The Vattenfall Group is currently building up an Enterprise Risk Management framework, which also includes quarterly risk reporting. Security risks and other risks that could lead to potential ICM risks are included in the ERM reporting. Vattenfall AB’s board of directors holds a yearly risk seminar, which also covers ICM risks.

Vattenfall has nuclear operations in Sweden and Germany. Nuclear safety is a central concern, which also includes extensive requirements for continuity planning and emergency management. This is handled in close co-operation with national authorities. From 8 February 2007 through 28 April 2008, Vattenfall AB’s board of directors had a safety committee that was tasked with closely monitoring and overseeing nuclear safety within the Group. The committee was dissolved in accordance with the Safety Committee’s recommendation, since it had been a temporary measure and had fulfilled its purpose since the recommended actions had been implemented, especially through the appointment of a Chief Nuclear Officer who reports directly to CEO on nuclear safety. In 2008, Vattenfall further raised its nuclear safety ambitions and set the goal of becoming Number One in Nuclear Safety in the industry within five years. Measures taken include the appointment of of a new independent Vattenfall Nuclear Safety Council, with external and international participants. The new organisation as of 1 January 2009, with a new Group-wide Nuclear power business unit as part of the new Pan Europe Business Group, will enable this development. In spring 2008, the OSART review performed at Forsmark concluded that Vattenfall’s safety management maintains a good international standard.

In 2008, four events classified as INES level 1 have occurred in Vattenfall’s nuclear power plants in Sweden (none in Germany):

  • June, Ringhals 2, insufficient flow from two pumps in the auxiliary feedwater system.
  • August, Ringhals 3, deviation in fuel design compared with specification.
  • August, Forsmark 2, a closed valve in the reactor emergency core cooling system caused one out of four parallel trains to be not operable.
  • October, Forsmark 3, one broken control rod out of a total of 169 control rods.

All events have been attended to, and measures taken.

Vattenfall also participates in various national programmes and forums regarding critical infrastructure protection.

© 2009 Vattenfall AB | 162 87 Stockholm | +46 8 739 50 00